Abstract
As a matter of fact, lawyers from all jurisdictions know what contract law is and how it is made. Although not explicable in a definite theory and despite differences regarding the relative weight of legislation compared to judicial lawmaking, this knowledge is entrenched in a common understanding of the strong role of the modern state in the administration of justice. In this article I argue that this common sense currently is subject to a fundamental transformation. As globalization has led to a shift in the legal needs of contract law consumers, the demand for legal certainty in cross-border transactions has increased. Section I explores this transition. Section II discusses how traditional concepts of private international law, mainly the law of conflicts and multilateral treaty harmonization, have proven unable to keep pace, allowing private actors to step in and gain a dominant position in providing legal services to international commerce. The resulting privatization of lawmaking leads to concerns regarding the legitimacy of transnational contract law. The new forms of lawmaking that can be observed in the transnational legal arena cannot be realigned with the traditional concepts of legitimacy of the constitutional state, nor is it appropriate to fall back on the even more out-dated concepts of natural or customary law. Rather it is necessary to reconceptualize the ideas of democratic lawmaking under the rule of law in order to adapt them to the reality of transnational lawmaking. In section III, I suggest that the concepts of "rough consensus" and "running code" are potential candidates in this endeavor.
I. Contract Law and Globalization
Commerce, defined as the marketing of goods and services, is dependent on a tremendously complex set of institutions, a very basic one being the enforcement of contractual commitments as a means for the voluntary exchange of property rights. The latter comprises not only substantive norms, i.e., contract law in a narrow sense, but procedural arrangements for dispute resolution and enforcement as well.
3 Since the welfare of modern Western societies is based on economic growth, there is a public interest in fostering commerce by providing efficient institutions for contract enforcement, at least in the market economies of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. This was one reason why rising nation states in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries modernized their legal systems by providing reliable public legal services with regard to dispute resolution and enforcement, and, in Continental Europe, by enacting codifications of substantive commercial and procedural law. 4 However, public interest in a flourishing economy does not necessarily imply that the state takes over the sole responsibility for the provision of legal certainty in the three dimensions of legislating, adjudicating, and enforcing. Institutions that support contractual commitments may also be provided by means of private ordering 5 or private law making. 6 Generally speaking, private ordering takes place "in the shadow of law," 7 i.e. private and public governance mechanisms work as supplements which are mutually dependent and reinforce each other. The relative weight of public and private ordering in the governance of contractual relations is subject to variations in time and space, a fact that is reflected in the eye-catching The situation is quite similar when it comes to cross-border commerce. When compared to domestic commercial transactions, public contract enforcement institutions are quite weak because additional uncertainties arise with regard to questions such as which court has jurisdiction, which national contract law that court shall apply, and whether a resulting judgment will be enforced in another nation state. Moreover, national courts are said to be ill-equipped with regard to expertise, language capabilities, costs, and length of procedure, a reason why international commercial arbitration has successfully established a dominant position on the market for cross-border dispute resolution.
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In fact, many scholars contend that one can observe the evolution of a global private regime for international commerce, 13 i.e. a New Law Merchant. 14 Contested as this thesis may be, 15 recent findings of empirical research on the institutional organization of cross-border commerce suggest that economic globalization has led to a fundamental transformation of commercial law with regard to the relative weight of public law and private ordering: "private governance on the transnational plane becomes much more comprehensive, systematic and ubiquitous." 16 In the following, I will focus on the investigation of only one aspect of the introduced problem. It concerns the making of substantive transnational contract law that emerges beyond both nation states and the multilateralism of international law. 
II. The Sufferings of Private International Law
If one conceives private international law as one component of a global economic constitution that provides a regulatory framework for the facilitation of crossborder commerce, 17 it can be said that it has meandered for more than 200 years and could easily mislead the legal layperson to the following judgment: "private international law is the cause of a problem, for which it regards itself as solution."
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A. The Nationalization of Contract Law
According to the Continental European model and its concept of the constitutional state, it is taken for granted that private law-like all law-is only conceivable as democratically legitimate parliamentary law. The Anglo-American common law system recognizes that legislation takes priority over adjudication (supremacy of parliament). After more than two centuries of increasingly interventionist private law legislation and adjudication, it is hard to avoid a perception that does not take the state's claim of the monopoly on legitimate lawmaking as part of the nation state's deep grammar. As a matter of self-immunization, the state subjects all forms of non-state law to different methods of degradation, namely incorporation, delegation, and deference.
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During the nineteenth century, the notion that all law is state law in combination with the heyday of the national idea entailed the nationalization of commercial law. 20 While private law was deformalized and modernized by means of reception and incorporation of the medieval lex mercatoria and the English law merchant, nineteenth century codification of commercial law-at least in Germany-aimed also at legal unification. Yet, at times the fact remained unnoted that domestic legal unity came paradoxically at the price of external legal divergence. For only the demise of the tradition of a common (uniform) private law (ius commune) made it necessary to create a law of conflicts, which as a conse- quence of legal positivism, could for its part not be conceived as a universal concept. Contrary to the prima facie meaning of "private international law," each nation state developed its own conflict rules.
B. The Multilateralism of International Law
Already in the second half of the nineteenth century, a countermotion to the described nationalization of commercial law emerged. Its proponents suggested establishing a world private law by means of multilateral treaty harmonization under international law. 21 However, more than 100 years of experience have shown that this strategy is hardly successful; its failure can be ascribed to the punctual orientation, procedures of multilateral negotiations, and intricate ratification of international treaties, which do not serve the efficient discussion of issues in contract law. 22 24 Overall, the current take on private law unification under international law is a disillusioned or even critical one.
25
C. Soft Law and Private Codification
The unification of private law through soft law is a promising alternative concept. 26 That is, international expert commissions develop abstract principles and rules of a particular legal area. Such committees can become active within international organizations and on private initiative. In the first case, the commissions formally negotiate on behalf of the member states of the relevant international organizations, with the aim not of concluding an international treaty but of fleshing out a nonbinding text that is recommended to the Member States for national implementation. This eases consensus-building as it allows every state to abstain from implementation or to alter a proposed stipulation in individual cases. The 1985 UN-CITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration is regarded as a particularly successful example; it has been implemented by fifty states and was used by numerous countries as the standard for the reform of their national arbitration laws.
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Private codifications, however, are developed without a formal mandate for legislation, so participants do not perceive themselves as state representatives; they argue according to their expertise and own interests. Founded on functional legal comparison, these formally non-binding results are conceived as the expression of universally valid legal principles, which constitute the common core of different national systems of private law. During the 1990s, two codifications of private law, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Lando Commission's Principles of European Contract Law, emerged in the domain of contract law. Both codifications not only attempt to function as model laws but also propose, as a formulation of general legal principles, to be available both to contractual parties by means of choice of law and to courts in their interpretation of contracts and state private law.
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D. Transnational Law and Lex Mercatoria
These catalogs of principles, therefore, are conceived as components of the lex mercatoria, the renaissance of which has been the subject of a lively debate since the 1960s. In 1956, Philip Jessup defined transnational law as "all law which regulates 745 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2001) (discussing new issues arising from the standardization of civil law through "soft law").
27 actions or events that transcend national frontiers." 29 Overcoming the traditional distinctions between national and international as well as public and private law, his aim was to establish a jurisprudence encompassing the law of cross-border social and especially economic phenomena more comprehensively than international law did, as the latter was seen as increasingly irrelevant and static in the Cold War era. 30 Whereas this approach diverted attention away from legal sources toward the increasing transnationality of legal matters, almost at the same time Goldman and Schmitthoff, two European law professors, developed a particular non-state interpretation of the term "transnational law." Both held the dream that a global contract law could be established by reviving the lex mercatoria within the jurisdiction of international commercial arbitration. 31 Here, transnational (commercial) law constitutes a third category of law beyond the traditional dichotomy of national and international law. 32 The New Law Merchant is conceived as an autonomous legal system beyond the nation state, which is based on general legal principles, i.e. the common core of national legal systems as explored by functional legal comparison (e.g.,the UNIDROIT principles), and on trade customs of international merchants as expressed in standardized contract terms (e.g., the Incoterms or model contract forms of the ICC).
33 Their application, interpretation, and development remain with international commercial arbitration.
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III. The Legitimation of Transnational Private Law
There is a heated debate about the existence and legal validity of transnational contract law; with regard to the New Law Merchant there is especially the issue of its democratic legitimacy. 35 This has also become relevant for the recent 
A. The Legitimation of State Private Law
"The final word always rests with state law; whatever it fails to authorize has no prospect of recognition-especially within a democratic state."
37 Typical for the debate about transnational private law, its arguments become somewhat opaque under close inspection, as the democratic legitimacy of state private law is highly overestimated. On the one hand, and despite some positive developments after the fall of the iron curtain, more than half of the world's population still lives in illiberal or semi-liberal states where private law can hardly be seen as democratically legitimated. 38 On the other hand, in liberal states the bulk of private law is at best democratically legitimized in a formal manner. Common law is judgemade law and applied, as long as parliament does not legislate in individual cases, due to legislative refrain from intervention. On a similarly fictitious basis, the (further) validity of the pre-constitutional German Civil Code (BGB of 1896) was justified under the German Constitution (Basic Law of 1949) after World War II. Yet, the Continental European codifications were prepared by experts from ministerial bureaucracies as well as academia and their substance was not discussed by parliament at all; at best, they were amended in individual cases in order to protect particular interests (e.g., those of beekeepers in section 964 BGB). This also applies to the Act to Modernize the Law of Obligations, which in 2001 was pushed through German Parliament in a disgraceful proceeding without any debate due to the expiring term for the implementation of the European Directive on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods. the decisive legitimacy deficit of today's private laws of the EC Member States. With regard to private law, the German legislator possesses practically no leeway because, since the 1980s, private law legislation almost exclusively implemented EC directives. Yet, the German legislator is practically not, and theoretically hardly, involved in the creation of EC legislation; often it does not take advantage of its remaining leeway, as it does not recognize its room for maneuver or is misled about it by interested parties. The German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has recently problematized this state of affairs with regard to the European arrest warrant.
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EC Directive law itself lacks legitimacy entirely if one applies a minimum standard geared toward a procedure facilitating rational outcomes in the sense of deliberative democracy. 41 One can, for instance, be reminded of the fact that during the debate about the transformation of the European Anti-Discrimination Directives 42 into German law the entire German government, including the current Minister of Justice, affirmed its incompetence concerning the Directive's content; it was argued that the Directives quasi-accidentally "slipped through" and that responsibility rested with the (meanwhile retired) Minister of Labor Riester, who had agreed unsuspectingly and without consultation. 43 That such deep interventions into the foundations of private law can occur within a democratic state in such a manner reduces the democracy argument put forward to absurdity. 
B. Rough Consensus and Running Code
If, with regard to the above-mentioned private codifications (e.g., the UNIDROIT Principles), it is argued that their validity resulted from "not ratione imperii, yet imperio rationis,"
44 unnecessary worries about expert domination over democratic legislation are fostered. 45 Regarding the legitimacy of transnational contract law, the reference to reason remains unsatisfactory as the contents of normative texts hardly impinge on their mode of action. "Structures are only real when they are used for linking communicative events; norms, only when they are quoted explicitly or implicitly. . . ."
46 Catalogs of general legal principles, as soft law, do not spring to life until they are applied in concrete cases and, hence, transformed into respectable hard code. In the legal process the condensation and confirmation of norms coincide. 47 In its directly legitimizing manner, this transformation process is linked back to the law-seeking citizens, a fact which is traditionally pigeonholed, somewhat imprecisely, as "customary law." In the nineteenth century, Savigny had qualified the interaction of "peoples' law" and "lawyers' law" in the emergence of customary law as follows: "law is first created by customs and popular belief, then by jurisprudence; thus everywhere by quietly working forces, but not by the will of the legislators."
48 From a current perspective, however, this wording requires an update in order to touch upon the legitimation mode of transnational contract law referred to in our context.
Internet Governance: The Legitimation of Open Technical Standards
"We reject: kings, presidents and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running code." 49 In order to safeguard its interoperationability as a network of networks, the Internet requires global technical standards, whose development was 44 carried out by Jon Postel, a California university student, in the 1970s. In order to maintain the quality of standards and to increase the motivation of globally dispersed webmasters for compliance, he developed the Request for Comments (RFC) procedure. 50 For the solution of a particular problem a team leader is appointed, who posts an RFC on the net. Everyone can digitally participate in the debate; primarily, interested experts from affected groups take part. Generally, standards should be established not by majority decision but through consensus by deliberation. Yet, in order to keep the debate from losing itself in contradicting alternatives or from starting all over again, the team leader can state a rough consensus concerning intermediary or final results. 51 Such an approximate or "rough consensus" has three implications: it indicates a) at the social level, a near unanimity among the participants (i.e., a fairly prevailing opinion), b) at the substantial level, a common denominator (i.e., a common core) and c) at the time level, a moment of temporariness regarding future improvements (i.e., learning aptitude). 52 Where a team has reached consensus about a new standard, the implementation phase begins, in which running code again holds three meanings: at first, the usability of a new standard is tested among a small group (pilot phase) before it is recommended for global implementation. Thereafter, the Internet community is free to accept or reject the proposal (recognition phase). Only if a standard has achieved broad acceptance so that its noncompliance would jeopardize interoperability, would a webmaster lose her freedom of choice (binding phase). 53 In analogy to IT language, the relevant standard then resembles a running code that functions in practice and is widespread. The "rough consensus and running code" procedure was later adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as well as the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and has since been elaborated. 54 
Modern Customary Law as Open Social Standard
This procedure is not only suitable for technical standards but can also be applied to social and legal norms. In a discourse theoretical view, rough consensus on the side of norm entrepreneurs stands for a deliberative procedure for creating norms that is geared to the scientific quest for truth. Running code refers to the recognition of such norms by consensus of all affected on the demand side and the 50 implementation of a norm in a regulatory competition that is characterized by network effects. 55 Both elements can be found in the production of soft law according to international law (UNCITRAL model law) and in the elaboration and application of private codifications (UNIDROIT and Lando Principles). The legal principles and fundamental rules inscribed into private codifications have to be grounded in a wide consensus regarding social, substantial, and time aspects if they strive to become a running code in practice. Expressed in the choice of law of such principles, the contractual parties' assent grounds their trust that these principles represent a broad accord.
In its result, a running code is not different from customary law. Yet, customary law has to start at some point. Rough consensus and running code can be seen as timely interpretations of the production of customary law. With regard to the legitimacy of transnational contract law, they can serve as elements of a theory of a "global civil law society," which replaces the "quietly working forces" of the nineteenth century. 56 Beyond customary law, which is merely bound to consuetudo and opinio necessitates and state law, which is constituted in formal legislative proceedings via majority decision, there seems to emerge a new form of legitimate lawmaking-especially for the supra-national and transnational spaces of action and communication. 57 
The Legitimation of the European Contract Law Project
Once a sensibility for innovative modes of legitimate lawmaking has been developed, traces of the new model can be discovered as well in the European contract law project: request for comments, rough consensus, and running code. 58 the European Commission has initiated an open and transparent process of discussion, which everyone interested could join by written statement and whose this instrument is gained, which depends mainly on the acceptance of the CFR by contract parties expressed by their choice of law, could the degree of obligation be raised by a transition from opt-in to opt-out; then the instrument would be applicable like state law even in the absence of a differing choice of law, as is the case with the CISG. 63 The triggered increase of precedent available on the interpretation of the CFR by state courts will result in a decrease in opt-outs by contract parties. At the end of the day the CFR may transform into a generally accepted practice by contract parties and their counsels which will be very difficult to avoid even by parties from non-member states of the EC (binding phase).
To sum up, the European contract law project resembles both the "rough consensus" and the "running code" method, i.e., the gradual codification and implementation of law dependent on the consent of the addressees of norms.
